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the competitive environment, the decision making process and technology.
Cooperatives are optimal when decision making costs are low. Else, cooper-
atives are increasingly dominated by either nonproﬁts or ﬁrms (depending
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The form an organization operates under is an important determinant of its eco-
nomic success. Although organizational choice may be perceived as ﬁxed over the
lifetime of many organizations, there exist several examples and incidences where
the endogeneity of organizational form can be inferred from. This is probably
most visible the case for recent events in the ﬁnancial sector: In 2005, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Mastercard, two major ﬁnancial institutions,
announced their plans to demutualize – that is their conversion from a cooper-
ative form of organization into an investor-owned ﬁrm.1 Visa, another major
credit card operator, followed suit in 2006 announcing its intention to demutual-
ize (with the exception of its European business). These speciﬁc events accord
well with a broader trend of organizational change in the ﬁnancial sector, such
as the banking and thrift or the insurance industry (see the survey by Chaddad
and Cook, 2004). Demutualization is also seen or discussed in other sectors, such
as retailing or the professional services.2 On the other hand, there are also sec-
tors where investor ownership is in decline (e.g. the nursing home industry – see
Chou, 2002). More generally, privatization of formerly public services (such as
hospitals, prisons, educational institutions) in many OECD countries also raises
questions about the appropriate organizational form these organizations should
be converted into. Here, the options discussed are usually investor-owned ﬁrm or
nonproﬁt form.
The above observations raise the following question: What determines opti-
mal organizational structures and changes therein? This paper aims at providing
an answer to this question by proceeding in three steps. First, in the spirit of
Hansmann (1996), it formalizes the diﬀerence between ﬁrms, nonproﬁts, and co-
operatives. Second, it compares the eﬃciency of these organizational forms and
thus endogenizes organizational choice. Third, the paper studies how changes in
1Both conversions were ﬁnalized in 2006: The NYSE converted its organization via the
acquisition of Archipelago in March 2006, while Mastercard listed its stock in May 2006 in an
IPO.
2In the UK, for example, the “Clementi Report” initiated a (still ongoing) discussion about
the pros and cons of investor ownership of law ﬁrms. See www.legal-services-review.org.uk/
and the reporting in The Economist, December 16th 2004, or in the business press (e.g. the
Financial Times, December 16th and 20th 2004).
1the environment aﬀect this eﬃciency comparison and might thus induce organi-
zational change. Speciﬁcally, it looks at the impact of outside competition – one
of the most frequently cited reasons for shifts in organizational structures.
Our paper analyzes a situation where consumers want to consume a quality
good and diﬀer in their preferences for quality. Consumers may choose between
the (higher) quality product provided by the organization in focus and a (lower
quality) outside product. Starting from fundamental assumptions on objectives
and rules of decision making but confronting each organization with the same en-
vironment, we derive equilibrium levels of quality, price, and total surplus. This
allows us to compare eﬃciency and to determine optimal organizational choice for
(i) purely proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms (investor ownership); (ii) nonproﬁts, governed
by a non-distribution constraint, and thus pursuing purely non-monetary objec-
tives; (iii) cooperatives, whose members may enjoy both monetary payoﬀs and
non-monetary beneﬁts. In either case we assume that each organization employs
a manager who can exert eﬀort to produce a good with the quality level set by
the organization’s owners. Because of owner heterogeneity, the decision making
process is costly whenever owners’ goal alignment is not perfect. Additionally,
we take into account the interaction between the set of owner-members (i.e. the
decision to join a cooperative or a nonproﬁt) and organizational outcomes.
We derive the following main results. In equilibrium, there is a clear ranking
of qualities provided: Firms provide lowest levels and nonproﬁts highest levels
of quality. Eﬃciency, however, depends on the cost of production and the cost
of collective decision making in an organization. For low cost of collective deci-
sion making, a cooperative usually is the most eﬃcient form of organization as
it honors both consumer surplus and proﬁts. Yet, as soon as these costs rise,
cooperatives are increasingly dominated by either nonproﬁts or ﬁrms (depending
on the incremental costs of quality production). Increased competition improves
the eﬃciency of ﬁrms vis-` a-vis nonproﬁts and cooperatives. Hence, in accordance
with the above-mentioned empirical observations, our model predicts organiza-
tional change towards investor ownership when competitive pressures rise.
In our approach, we follow the literature on organizational choice which em-
phasizes the diﬀerences in objectives induced by diﬀerent organizational forms.3
3Note that this approach diﬀers from the literature on organizational design that analyzes
internal structures in order to determine their optimality – given the organizational objective.
2Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) analyze nonproﬁt versus ﬁrm organization when
quality matters but is non-observable. By choosing the nonproﬁt form, an en-
trepreneur commits to lowering his proﬁt motive (as dividends are only consumed
as perks), thus alleviating the underprovision of quality. Hart and Moore (1996)
discuss the trade-oﬀ between ﬁrms and cooperatives when monopoly pricing or
skewness in members’ preferences distort prices away from the ﬁrst-best. Ad-
ditionally, their paper considers eﬀects of competition and ﬁnds that ﬁrms are
better suited to face competition than cooperative forms of organization. In an
analysis of partnerships (deﬁned via the proﬁt-per-partner payout), Levin and
Tadelis (2005) focus on the choice of partner quality. The authors show that
partnerships are preferable in settings of high market power (informational asym-
metries). Finally, Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) look at the trade-oﬀ between
public versus private ﬁrms in the provision of quality and cost eﬃciency. Again,
the diﬀerent objectives implied by an organizational form aﬀect the economic
outcomes and highlight the trade-oﬀs in organizational choice.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 characterizes the three
organizational forms analyzed in this paper and relates our paper further to the
literature. Section 3 outlines the model. In section 4 we derive and compare
equilibria and eﬃciency for the three organizational forms. Section 5 analyzes how
changes in the competitive environment aﬀect organizational eﬃciency and thus
choice. Section 6 discusses robustness and extensions while section 7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Organizational Forms
Within the property rights based theory of the ﬁrm, an organization is character-
ized by ownership over assets. Following the literature, ownership is deﬁned by
residual rights of control in this paper.4 Consequently, one of the crucial traits
of any organization is the identity of its owners. The type of owners, combined
with other restrictions and determinants of their action space, determines the
nature of the organization’s overall objective function. Hereafter, we characterize
each organizational form in three dimensions: (i) Who holds the residual rights
See, for example, Athey and Roberts (2001) or Hart and Moore (2005).
4See Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990).
3of control? (ii) Who owns the claims to any residual income? (iii) What is the
objective function of the owners? Further questions to be asked for any organi-
zational form are: Where does the organization obtain ﬁnancing from? And how
do (multiple) owners achieve a decision about the issues at hand (and at what
cost)? We will discuss these issues in the following paragraphs. Table 1 in the
appendix summarizes the major characteristics for all three organizational forms.
As the reference form, we deﬁne any organization owned by investors (share-
holders) maximizing their ﬁnancial return on investment as a ﬁrm.5 These in-
vestors hold both residual rights of income and control. Absent any other imper-
fections, all shareholders of a ﬁrm pursue the same goal, that is maximizing ﬁrm
proﬁts. Our basic analysis will hence show that investors’ interests are completely
aligned, and thus any investor could decide on behalf of the other investors. All
operational costs in a ﬁrm have to be covered by its (expected) retained earnings.
On the other side of the organizational spectrum, we ﬁnd nonproﬁts. An orga-
nization is deﬁned as a nonproﬁt if its owners – henceforth called members – have
a purely non-ﬁnancial interest in the activity of the organization. By deﬁnition,
members of a nonproﬁt, in contrast both to ﬁrms and cooperatives, forego all
rights of residual income. Generally, these rights could rest with the members as
non-monetary perquisites (see e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001), be transferred to a
manager or other employees (in cash or in perquisites), or be transferred to some
other charitable use. Generally, this ex ante waiver of residual income is captured
by the term non-distribution constraint.6 Despite the absence of residual income
rights, members may use their control rights to dismiss managers not complying
with their duty. This managerial compliance could be assured either by delega-
tion via a board of trustees or directly via the members’ general meeting.7 We
5Unlike Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), we exclude single-owner and owner-managed ﬁrms but
focus on multiple ownership as this allows us to capture issues of collective decision making as
a speciﬁc and important aspect of many ownership structures.
6Note that other authors allow nonproﬁts to distribute their proﬁts to owners, be it directly
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006) or indirectly via price subsidies (Kuan, 2001). While relaxing
the nondistribution constraint takes into account aspects of many real nonproﬁt organizations,
we stick to the original constraint in order to highlight the generic characteristics of nonproﬁts.
7In any type of organization with dispersed multiple owners, a manager has some leeway.
However, once the cost of (mis-)behavior are suﬃciently high or issues at stake are suﬃciently
important, owners/members can be expected to interfere and to be actively involved in the
decision making process. See O’Regan and Oster (2005) for empirical evidence on the behaviour
4will show that the interests of the members of a nonproﬁt are perfectly aligned as
all members only focus on quality. Hence, similar to the ﬁrm case, any individual
owner could serve as a nonproﬁt’s ﬁnal authority writing the incentive contract.
Finally, note that nonproﬁts may (and often do) receive ﬁnancing from donations
or membership fees, in addition to ﬁnancing out of retained earnings.8
Cooperatives resemble ﬁrms regarding the ability to pay out dividends, but
they also have elements of a nonproﬁt: We deﬁne an organization as a cooperative
if its owners have a direct interest in the cooperative’s activity (as consumers, in
this paper) but also care about dividends. Hence, members of a cooperative hold
both residual rights of income and control. Our results will show that this leads to
disagreement among members. As a consequence, it is the median member who
eﬀectively determines the manager’s employment contract.9 In general, members
of a cooperative have both their expected consumer surplus and the organization’s
revenues to ﬁnance operations.
In the terminology of Hansmann (1996), our model analyzes the ability of
the three organizational forms to overcome the costs of market contracting which
arise from market power in setting price and quality.10 By assuming certain key
features distinguishing the organizations, we model the trade-oﬀ between several
costs of ownership. On the one hand, all organizations face the same cost struc-
ture for the production of quality (mainly in the form of managerial eﬀort costs).
On the other hand, there are costs of ownership which diﬀer between the orga-
nizational forms: In investor-owned ﬁrms and to a lesser extent in cooperatives,
consumer surplus has less weight (relative to proﬁts) in the decision making pro-
cess of the owners than is socially desirable. In combination with market power,
this leads to underprovision of quality. The reverse is true for nonproﬁts: Due
to the nondistribution constraint, consumer surplus is key in owners’ decision
of nonproﬁts’ board members and executive directors.
8In the paper, we assume donors and members to be identical. We use the term members in
order to highlight their possession of residual rights of control. Our speciﬁcation of nonproﬁts
and its owners is equivalent to the nonproﬁt cooperative of Hart and Moore (1998) and is related
to the commercial nonproﬁt of Hansmann (1996).
9This is a standard assumption in voting procedures. Refer to Roberts (1977) or Hart and
Moore (1996), for example.
10For cooperatives, Hart and Moore (1998) highlight another source for costs of market con-
tracting: Price diﬀerentiation between members and non-members (or the payment of dividends
as price subsidies).
5making while proﬁtability aspects are neglected. Hence, costly overprovision of
quality results. Finally, if individual members’ preferences for quality diﬀer and
goal alignment of the membership base is not achieved, an organization incurs
extra costs of collective decision making. In our model, these costs may translate
the cooperative’s advantage of featuring both consumer surplus and proﬁts in
owners’ optimization problem into a disadvantage.
Costs of collective decision making are common in the organizational eco-
nomics literature, as discussed broadly in Hansmann (1996). In this paper, we
mainly interpret them as costs of the decision making process (see Dow and
Putterman, 2000; Dow, 2001, for examples of the costs incurred in worker coop-
eratives). Costly decision processes usually stem from the need of members to
collect information prior to the decision making, and from the costs of attending
meetings. Additionally, there is a set of costs arising in the decision process when
multiple issues are to be decided and voting cycles might occur (see Zusman,
1992). Costs of collective decision making usually increase in the heterogeneity
of a cooperative’s members. Finally, apart from the direct costs of the decision
making process, further costs can arise from inﬂuence activities in organizations
(see Milgrom, 1988, for example).
3 The Model
3.1 General Structure
Consider a market for a quality product supplied by a single organization and
demanded by a set of consumers (see below). Irrespective of its form, an or-
ganization is run by a single manager controlled by the organization’s owners.
These owners are either ﬁnancial investors or a sub-set of the consumers in the
market. Finally, there is a benevolent social planner whose only aim is to maxi-
mize the sum of consumer and producer surplus in the market.11 All agents are
risk-neutral.
11The focus in our paper is on organizational eﬃciency. For this reason, we introduce the
social planner as a player maximizing total surplus to ensure that the eﬃcient organizational
choice is made ex ante. The central trade-oﬀ of the model prevails as long as the agent in charge
of choosing organizational form positively values both consumer and producer surplus – even
with excessive weight put on either side of the market.
6Demand for the good stems from a mass of consumers normalized to unity.
While consumers appreciate quality, they diﬀer in the degree they value it. Let
v(p,q,θ
i,y) = max{ψ(p,q,θ
i);0} + y (1)
be consumer i’s indirect utility, where y denotes any monetary income and
ψ(p,q,θi) ≡ θiq − p is i’s consumption utility, which depends on the quality
q ∈ [0;1] and the price p of the good as well as her personal valuation of quality,
θi. The term θiq thus represents consumer i’s willingness to pay for a good of
quality q, which is assumed to be unaﬀected by potential dividend payments.12
Individual valuation of quality is private knowledge and distributed uniformly
over [0;1].
Due to minimum eﬃcient scale requirements (ﬁxed set-up costs), no entry
occurs and the quality q oﬀered is identical for all consumers. At the same
time, there exists an imperfectly substitutable product oﬀered in an alternative
market. This competitive fringe is characterized by the tuple (p0,q0) where p0
is the price of this good and q0 denotes the quality equivalent of the substitute.
We impose the following restrictions: q > q0 + p0 and q0 > p0 ≥ 0.13 The
former implies that the organization analyzed here provides a superior good (low
degree of substitutability of the alternative good) while the latter ensures that
the substitute good is a relevant alternative.
All organizational forms face the same technology and production and sales
processes. Operations require spending ﬁxed costs of M, normalized to zero for
the main part of the analysis.14 Production then requires a manager to exert
12Consumers are thus assumed to have quasi-linear preferences with respect to the quality
product and some composite good. Hence, dividends do not aﬀect the purchasing decision of
consumers. Alternatively, one could assume that consumers purchase a large set of goods and
have further sources of income. Any dividend payments in our model would hence be split on
the whole set of goods and can be considered negligible relative to the other income.
13The parameters for the competitive fringe are exogenous and may not be aﬀected directly
by any player, including the social planner. We think of (p0,q0) being inﬂuenced by the general
environment and trends such as globalization or technological development. Also note that
although the model shares some features with those of vertical diﬀerentiation (see for example
Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Choi and Shin, 1992), there are diﬀerent comparative static eﬀects (see
section 5). These are due to the non-strategic interaction between the organization considered
and the competitive fringe.
14The eﬀect of positive levels of M will be discussed in section 6.
7personal eﬀort to produce quality q. Let
e(q) ≥ 0 (2)
be the twice continuously diﬀerentiable eﬀort cost function of the manager with
standard convexity assumptions:15
e
0(q) ≥ 0 , e
00(q) > 0 and e(q = 0) = 0 (3)
Finally, the manager sets the price p monopolistically and produces as many
units of the good as demanded with marginal cost normalized to zero. Given this
structure of production, owners of an organization have to induce the manager
to provide the desired quality (and thus personal eﬀort). This is done by a
simple incentive contract specifying quality and a corresponding wage structure
w. Assuming the manager has an outside option of zero and limited liability, this
reduces to compensating the manager for his personal eﬀort when quality is as
required (and paying a zero wage otherwise). If owners’ preferences concerning the
speciﬁcs of the contract (the quality to be produced) are not perfectly aligned,
they have to induce a decision by majority voting. In this case, the decision
making process involves costs of collective decision making D.16
While we assume quality to be observable and contractible, it is also possible
to use our framework when quality is imperfectly observable, such as in the case
of experience goods. Then, the ﬁxed cost of M might be interpreted as the cost
of installing some monitoring technology (e.g. independent audits) that allows
owners of an organization to contract on quality again. Or, M might capture
the cost of commitment or build-up of reputation for an organization (or its
manager). Investment in credibility then alleviates the potential moral hazard
problem between the organization and its customers.
3.2 Timing
Organizational set-up:
15Where necessary, we impose additional restrictions in the subsequent analysis that restrict
attention to interior solutions.
16Under perfect goal alignment, decision making authority can be assigned to any owner.
Without goal alignment, costly joint decision making is necessary.
8• At t = 0 the social planner chooses the organizational form and decides
about setting up a membership fee structure. Consumers decide about
joining the organization as owners.
• At t = 1 owners specify the management contract (quality to be produced).
This is costless if all owners agree on the quality level to be speciﬁed. Oth-
erwise, costs of D are incurred to identify the median owner.
Production and consumption period:
• At t = 2 the manager produces quality q, expands eﬀort e(q), and sets price
p.
• At t = 3 consumers decide about purchasing the good (or its substitute).
All payoﬀs (consumption utility, wage payments and dividend payments)
are realized thereafter.
We solve this game by backward-induction to identify a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.
3.3 Organizational Set-up
Owners’ decisions during the set-up period (in t = 1) are inﬂuenced by expecta-
tions on the proﬁts πj(p,q,w) of the organizations, where j ∈ {F,N,C}.17 Let q∗
j
be the solution to the optimization problem of the organization’s owners without
any budgetary restrictions. πj(q∗




j,·) ≥ 0 (4)
such that the organization does not need to collect fees to ﬁnance operations. In
section 6 we will discuss robustness of our results if proﬁts are negative.
While fees are not needed to support operations (in the basic model), we al-
low the social planner to levy a fee in order to inﬂuence the set of consumers
owning the organization. However, the ability of the social planner to collect
membership fees from organization j’s owners is restricted by private knowledge
17We use subscripts to denote organizational forms and superscripts to identify speciﬁc con-
sumers.
9of individual preferences for quality, θi. Nevertheless, the literature on mechanism
design has shown that one can induce agents to reveal their privately observable
preferences.18 Following this literature, we assume that a mechanism exists such
that the social planner can collect a uniform fee from any consumer with pref-
erences for quality above some threshold level. This is achieved by specifying a
membership fee f plus a minimum amount of membership fee income (or mass of
consumers to join), such that every consumer with (expected) consumer surplus
higher than f is vital for the organization to be set up.19
It is crucial that the social planner is able to credibly commit to not establish-
ing an organization whenever the minimum mass of fee income is not collected.
The capability of the social planner to commit to this mechanism could be inter-
preted as the power of the government to enact a law that binds judiciary and
executive authorities. Then, the legislative body will not alter any regulations
or laws as long as the cost of ex post adjustment of the law is suﬃciently high.
Finally, note that the social planner will only use the right to levy a fee in t = 0
if this measure increases eﬃciency.
4 Organizational Performance
Before analyzing the eﬀects of the three diﬀerent organizational forms, let us de-
rive some preliminary insights. Consider ﬁrst the pricing decision of the manager
in organization j once the quality level qj is set. Consumer i will purchase the
good as long as ψ(pj,qj,θi) ≥ max{ψ(p0,q0,θi),0}. With q0 > p0, total demand
for the good is 1− ˆ θj, where ˆ θj denotes the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent





Faced with this demand structure, the manager sets the price in t = 2 in order to
maximize revenues (given zero marginal cost) (1 − ˆ θj(p))p. The market outcome
18See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 7. In contrast to the literature on the private
provision of public goods (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986; Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997),
consumers have zero marginal eﬀect on the good’s provision in our framework.
19We use this mechanism to rule out free-riding among individuals with high θi-realizations
in our continuous modelling of agents.















Next, the manager has to be compensated for his personal eﬀort cost in pro-
ducing quality qj; hence his wage is wj = e(qj). Thus, the proﬁts of the organi-
zation will be
πj(qj) =
(qj − q0 + p0)2
4(qj − q0)
− e(qj) − IjD (7)
where Ij = 1 if costs of collective decision making have to be incurred, and Ij = 0
otherwise. These results hold for any organizational form and create the level
playing ﬁeld for the subsequent derivation of organizational outcomes.
Finally, consider the choice of quality if the social planner were owner of the
organization. Generally, given the price setting behavior of the manager, the
total surplus created in the market as a function of qj is deﬁned as the sum























q0 deﬁnes the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying


























Maximization of this surplus with respect to qj by the social planner deﬁnes the








8(qSB − q0)2 (10)
20We use the term second-best to highlight that the quality choice of the social planner is
made under the assumption of monopolistic pricing behavior by the manager. The ﬁrst-best
quality level qFB would solve maxq
R 1
0 (θq)dθ − e(q); hence, e0(qFB) = 1/2. Derivation of this
ﬁrst-best result embodies price equal marginal cost (here: zero). Finally, note that convexity of
eﬀort cost ensures that second-order conditions for both ﬁrst-best and second-best are always
satisﬁed.
11To ensure an inner solution, qSB < 1, we henceforth assume
e






8(1 − q0)2. (11)
The second-best quality level serves as a reference level for the subsequent anal-
ysis.
4.1 Firms
By deﬁnition, shareholders of a ﬁrm do not consume the good themselves. Proﬁt
maximization is the single objective equally aspired by all shareholders. Given
the expected market outcome as speciﬁed in equation (7), an investor thus aims





(qF − q0 + p0)2
4(qF − q0)
− e(qF) − IFD

. (12)
Lemma 1 (Quality Provision of the Firm)
(i) The ﬁrm oﬀers product quality q∗
F ≡
n







(ii) Goal alignment among shareholders is perfect (IF = 0).
The trade-oﬀ investors face is the increase in revenues from higher pricing
versus higher costs of compensating the manager for his eﬀort to produce higher
quality. Firms hence provide goods of superior quality relative to the quality of
the fringe as long as proﬁts are non-negative. At the same time, it is obvious that
a ﬁrm never has to bear costs of collective decision making: The pure focus on
ﬁnancial returns and the resulting goal alignment among shareholders is one of
the key strengths of investor-owned ﬁrms, as it has been stressed in the literature
for already some time (see Fama, 1978).
4.2 Nonproﬁts
Members of a nonproﬁt organization explicitly waive their rights to any residual
income, which we assume to be transferred to some charitable organization not
modelled explicitly.21 The manager’s constraints are not aﬀected by the organi-
zational form of his employer. Let θi denote member i’s preference for quality.
21This is a common legal rule, internationally.












Lemma 2 (Quality Provision of the Nonproﬁt)
(i) The nonproﬁt oﬀers product quality of q∗
N ≡ 1.
(ii) The social planner imposes a membership fee fN =
q0−p0
2 and a minimum
membership requirement of 50% of the population. Consumers with θi ≥ 1/2 pay
the fee and become members, others do not.
(iii) Goal alignment among members is perfect (IN = 0).
The result for the nonproﬁt in this lemma depends on the non-distribution
constraint in two respects. First, without any potential dividend payments, own-
ers simply care about their indirect utility from consuming the good. Hence,
for the set of owners (or at least the median owner) higher quality is always
better. As a consequence, maximum quality q∗
N = 1 is chosen. Second, the
non-distribution constraint allows the social planner to exclude consumers with
relatively low preferences for quality from the set of owners: Levying a fee is a
credible device as excess funds will never be returned to owners.22 Excluding
certain consumers establishes goal alignment among the remaining owners (with
high preferences for quality) without aﬀecting the ﬁnal quality decision.
4.3 Cooperatives
In a cooperative, owners potentially get the best of two worlds: They are able
to decide about the quality of the good to be provided (which they value them-
selves as consumers) and they participate in residual proﬁts. Due to individual
preferences for quality being private knowledge we assume the simplest dividend
structure feasible: Each member gets an equal share of total operating proﬁts.
However, members have to buy the good for being eligible to receive dividend
payments.23
22This contrasts with the subsequent discussion of the cooperative results.
23This is common in many cooperatives. The requirement generally ensures that individuals
do not join the cooperative as members for pure ﬁnancial reasons (as investors).
13Let ˜ θC be the marginal member of the cooperative and δC ≡ 1
1−˜ θC a member’s












(qC − q0 + p0)2
(qC − q0)4
− e(q) − ICD

(14)
Member i thus maximizes the sum of his indirect utility from purchase of the
good and his share in the residual income (proﬁts).
Lemma 3 (Quality Provision of the Cooperative)
(i) The cooperative oﬀers product quality q∗
C ≡
n







(ii) There is no goal alignment among members (IC = 1).
Members of the cooperative face the trade-oﬀ between choosing higher quality
levels, which increases consumption utility at higher costs of inducing manage-
rial eﬀort, or inducing lower quality and thus increasing their dividend payout.
Consequently, neither the maximum quality level of the nonproﬁt nor the proﬁt-
maximizing level of the ﬁrm are optimal for members. Additionally, the trade-oﬀ
between consumption utility and dividends depends on individual preferences.
Hence, members of the cooperative incur costs of collective decision making. Fi-
nally, although the social planner is unable to avoid costly decision making by
excluding some consumers from ownership, it would be possible to improve upon
the organizational outcome by restricting membership to the cooperative: The
resulting shift of the position of the median member would also aﬀect the quality
decision of the cooperative’s owners. However, since fees collected at the be-
ginning will be repaid at the end (as part of the dividends), levying a fee is no
credible device to exclude consumers from the set of owners. Hence, there is no
restriction on ownership of the cooperative by the social planner.
Overall, there is a clear ranking in terms of quality provided in the market by
the three forms of organization.
Proposition 1 (Ranking of Qualities Provided)





Nonproﬁt members, by waiving their rights to appropriate the residual in-
come, only care about consumer surplus. Consequently, they demand the maxi-
mum level of quality and neglect any ineﬃciencies arising from overspending on
14quality. This explains why nonproﬁts are often perceived to operate ineﬃciently
and expensively. Nevertheless, overspending is completely in the interest of their
members, as they exchange income rights for quality. The social planner, in con-
trast, trades oﬀ the beneﬁts and costs (speciﬁcally the manager’s eﬀort cost) of
quality. By (11), qSB is an interior solution.
On the other side, ﬁrms exclusively maximize monetary proﬁts, thus produc-
ing too low a quality.24 Cooperatives, while being an organizational mix of ﬁrms
and nonproﬁts, provide a level of quality that lies between the level of ﬁrms and
the second-best level. The objective function of cooperative members contains
both consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consequently, cooperatives even
achieve the second-best quality level under certain circumstances.25 However, the
presence of the competitive fringe (with q0 > p0 > 0) leads the cooperative to
include ineﬃciently many members with low quality preferences (˜ θC = ˆ θC < 1/2).
Therefore, under these circumstances cooperatives provide ineﬃciently low qual-
ity.
4.4 Comparing Organizational Forms
The preceding analysis has shown that the three organizational forms provide dif-
ferent levels of price-quality combinations. However, the quality level alone does
not automatically determine which organization is eﬃcient. To draw conclusions
about the eﬃciency of an organization, total surpluses have to be compared. We
will thus use the total surplus as in (9) to compare two organizations at a time
and to characterize the conditions under which each of them generates a higher
total surplus.
Proposition 2 (Organizational Eﬃciency)
(i): Total surplus under nonproﬁt organization is higher than under ﬁrm organi-

















24Note that consumers with θ < ˆ θ have the same objectives as these investors: Given the
monopolistic behavior of the ﬁrm, they will never purchase the good and would only care about
dividends. A ﬁrm in our model might thus be owned by consumers with low valuation of quality.
25Cooperatives would produce second-best quality for p0 = 0, that is under highest compet-
itive pressure from the competitive fringe.
15is satisﬁed. Otherwise, ﬁrms generate higher total surplus.
(ii): Total surplus under cooperative organization is higher than under ﬁrm or-
ganization (or equal to) if

















is satisﬁed. Otherwise, ﬁrms generate higher total surplus. ¯ DCF ≥ 0.
(iii): Total surplus under cooperative organization is higher than under nonproﬁt
organization (or equal to) if

















is satisﬁed. Otherwise, nonproﬁts generate higher total surplus.
Comparing nonproﬁt with ﬁrm organization, ﬁrms provide lower quality but
generate higher proﬁts as the compensation of managerial eﬀort is less costly.
Nonproﬁts, on the other hand, provide higher quality and hence consumer surplus,
but this comes at the expense of higher eﬀort cost. The LHS of condition (15)
measures the additional costs incurred from increasing the quality level of the
ﬁrm to nonproﬁt level relative to the quality change. Intuitively, if the excess
quality provision by the nonproﬁt is less costly, high quality production by the
manager is aﬀordable and nonproﬁt organization dominates ﬁrm organization. If
high eﬀort is instead overly costly, it is more eﬃcient to let a ﬁrm produce the
good.
Since decision making in cooperatives implies extra costs of collective deci-
sion making, parts (ii) and (iii) of proposition 2 depend on D. We ﬁnd that
cooperatives dominate ﬁrms as long as the costs of collective decision making are
suﬃciently low. This result is intuitive since we have q∗
F < q∗
C ≤ qSB: Only large
realizations of D can make cooperatives less eﬃcient than ﬁrms. Therefore, if
collective decision making is not very costly – for example because of low hetero-
geneity of owners – cooperatives combine the best of two worlds by maximizing
both consumer surplus and owners’ proﬁts.
As q∗
C ≤ qSB < q∗
N, it is not so clear whether cooperatives or nonproﬁts are
more eﬃcient, even if decision making costs in cooperatives are low. In addition
to low D, superiority of cooperative relative to nonproﬁt organization requires
16that the cost increases from raising quality from cooperative level (potentially
too low) to nonproﬁt level (excessively high) is suﬃciently high.
All three pairwise eﬃciency comparisons depend on the relation of cost and
quality diﬀerences, which is equivalent to the slope coeﬃcient of a line through the
eﬀort cost function at the two distinct quality levels. These three slope coeﬃcients
can be varied most easily by altering the convexity of the eﬀort cost function:
An increase (decrease) in convexity for the whole curve increases (decreases)
the relevant slope coeﬃcients, and hence aﬀects the relative eﬃciency of the
three organizations. This eﬀect is used in ﬁgure 1 which illustrates the eﬃciency
comparisons of proposition 2. Using a numerical example, we plot the critical
D
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Figure 1: Optimal Organizational Forms (Numerical Example)
levels of the costs of collective decision making against a measure for the convexity
of eﬀort cost.26 For decision making cost levels above the line ¯ DCF, ﬁrms produce
higher total surplus than cooperatives. Similarly, for levels above the line ¯ DCN,
nonproﬁts dominate cooperative organizations. With rising costs D the set of
parameters where cooperatives are preferable shrinks and becomes empty at the
intersection of the two lines. For even higher cost levels, only ﬁrms or nonproﬁts
can be eﬃcient, depending on the convexity of eﬀort (with the vertical line giving
the threshold level). The ﬁgure also highlights which organization is most eﬃcient
in the six parameter sets deﬁned by the three plotted lines.
26For details on the numerical example see appendix A.10.
17Proposition 2 and ﬁgure 1 specify the main results of the analysis so far. The
social planner will choose the most eﬃcient organizational form in t = 0, which
depends on speciﬁc parameters of the exogenous variables. This strategy, together
with lemmas 1 to 3 as well as equation (6), characterizes a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
5 Organizational Change
What happens to relative organizational eﬃciency if the pressure exerted by the
competitive fringe is increased? Or, alternatively: Do we expect organizational
persistence in a changing competitive environment (due to, for example, global-
ization or technological progress)? To approach this issue, we now consider how
our previous results are aﬀected by changes in the competitive fringe.
Note ﬁrst that in t = 2, the decisions of the organization’s manager determine
the market outcome, described by p∗
j, ˆ θ∗
j and π∗
j in (6) and (7). The comparative
statics of these variables with respect to the price p0 of the substitute good
is intuitive: A decrease in p0 makes the substitute good more attractive, thus
taking away market share from the organization. Although this is countered by







dp0 < 0 and
dπj
dp0 > 0.
A change in the quality equivalent q0 of the substitute good, however, has
slightly diﬀerent eﬀects: A more attractive substitute good (higher q0) is coun-




dq0 < 0 and
dˆ θ∗
j
dq0 ≤ 0. This latter result appears counter-
intuitive and is due to the increased elasticity of demand. As the substitute good’s
quality rises, not only its attractiveness rises but also the vertical diﬀerentiation
between the two markets decreases. Hence, consumers react more sensitively to
price diﬀerences. For this reason, the lowering of p∗
j actually leads to a higher
level of sales than before. Overall however, proﬁts still decrease:
dπj
dq0 < 0. As
the eﬀect of changes in q0 are rather speciﬁc to our modelling structure, we will
focus on changes in the price level p0 of the competitive fringe in our following
analysis.27
27In the standard models of vertical diﬀerentiation, prices and quality levels are strategic
choices of all players. As we disregard strategic interaction between the organization and the
185.1 Changes in Quality and Ownership
Optimal quality levels q∗
j chosen in t = 1 are also aﬀected by changes in the
competitive fringe. We now analyze how the price p0 aﬀects quality, and use a
decrease in this price (tougher competitive environment) for interpretation. This
might be due to some process innovation in the market segment producing the
closest substitute which decreases marginal costs and thus aﬀects the price level
in a similar fashion.
Lemma 4 (Changes in Quality)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following eﬀects:












The intuition for this lemma is rather simple. Owners in ﬁrms and cooper-
atives positively value dividends and therefore counter the negative eﬀect of a
more attractive competitive fringe by further diﬀerentiating their product qual-
ity from the substitute quality. Hence, competition induces them to increase the
quality on oﬀer (competition eﬀect). For the cooperative, there is an additional
membership eﬀect: A tougher competitive environment implies that the coopera-
tive loses some members/customers. As this shifts the preferences of the median
member upwards, there is an additional positive eﬀect on the quality (as long
as ˜ θ ≤ 1/2). Since nonproﬁts already produce the maximum quality achievable,
they cannot increase quality furthermore. The only measure of nonproﬁts to re-
act to increased competitive pressure is by cutting the price. Accordingly, since
qN in (6) remains constant, nonproﬁts will lose a comparatively higher market
share than cooperatives or ﬁrms.
Lemma 5 (Relative Changes in Quality)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following eﬀects:











competitive fringe, focussing on changes in the exogenous price p0 (as a proxy for changes in
competitiveness) is appropriate here. For completeness, we report the results for changes in q0
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F−q0) and vice versa
otherwise.
The comparisons of quality changes of the nonproﬁt with the ﬁrm or the
cooperative are trivial: Nonproﬁts do not alter the quality level in the light of
increased competition from the fringe, but ﬁrms and cooperatives do so. There-
fore, ﬁrms and cooperatives reduce the quality lead of the nonproﬁt by increasing
their own quality levels.
The comparison of changes in qualities for cooperative and ﬁrm is less ob-
vious. Lemma 5.(iii) illustrates that the form of the eﬀort cost function plays
an important role. If its curvature and the quality diﬀerences between ﬁrm and
cooperative are large enough, then the ﬁrm will react more strongly to changes
in the competitive environment than the cooperative.28 However, if the condition
in lemma 5.(iii) is not satisﬁed, then the cooperative’s quality lead over the ﬁrm
increases under a more competitive environment.
5.2 Changes in Eﬃciency
We have characterized all preliminary results needed to analyze changes in the
optimality of organizational forms. We now present our central result on organi-
zational change.
Proposition 3 (Changes in Organizational Eﬃciency)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following eﬀects:








(iii) total surplus under ﬁrm organization relative to cooperative organization in-
creases,
d(TSC−TSF)






dp0 ≥ 0 is
satisﬁed.
28Note that the condition e000(q) ≥ 0 is not suﬃcient for the condition in lemma 5.(iii) to be
met. The reason for this is the aforementioned membership eﬀect which adds upon the more
standard competition eﬀect.
20The total surplus generated by an organizational form directly depends on the
position of its quality level relative to the second-best quality level. As speciﬁed
in proposition 1, q∗
F < q∗
C ≤ qSB, while q∗
N > qSB. Both ﬁrms and cooperatives
react to increased outside competition by increasing their quality levels, thus get-
ting closer to the second-best solution and diminishing ineﬃcient underprovision
of quality. Nonproﬁt quality, on the other side, is not aﬀected by outside compe-
tition as nonproﬁt members only care about their utility from consumption. This
explains why nonproﬁts lose relative to ﬁrms and cooperatives when competition
gets tougher, as emphasized in parts (i) and (ii) of proposition 3.
Whether ﬁrms or cooperatives become more eﬃcient when outside competi-
tion is increased depends on the pace with which their quality levels move towards
qSB. The discussion of lemma 5.(iii) above illustrates the relevant factors and
explains that this issue is generally unclear. However, if ﬁrms adapt to compe-
tition more strongly than cooperatives, they also gain in terms of total surplus
under higher competition.29
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Figure 2: Organizational Change (Numerical Example)
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬃciency comparisons of proposition 3. Using the same
numerical example as in ﬁgure 1, we plot the critical levels of the costs of collective
decision making against the measure for convexity of eﬀort cost.30 The ﬁgure
29It is worth pointing out that in numerical simulations of the model, the growth of total
surplus under ﬁrm organization always exceeded the growth of total surplus under cooperative
organization for various eﬀort cost functions.
30See appendix A.10 for more details on the numerical example.
21illustrates how the set of parameters where either of the organizational forms is
optimal changes under competition. The solid lines replicate the static eﬃciency
comparison of ﬁgure 1. The dashed lines show the new optimal organizational
choice if outside competition has increased. The eﬀort function used here results
in ﬁrms becoming more eﬃcient relative to both nonproﬁts and cooperatives.
Similarly, nonproﬁts lose against both ﬁrms and cooperatives, while cooperatives
lose against ﬁrms but gain relative to nonproﬁts.
6 Discussion and Extensions
Operational losses, organizational existence, and membership fees: We
assumed throughout the previous analysis that proﬁts of all organizations are non-
negative (see (4)). We will now argue that the results of our model are robust
even if the revenues of an organization are too low to ﬁnance its operations. Since
the ﬁxed costs M are the only cost type that aﬀects all three organizational forms
equally, we consider an increase in these costs and ask how this aﬀects our results
in terms of relative eﬃciency of the organizations.
For both ﬁrms and nonproﬁts, an increase in costs such that proﬁts turn
negative has straightforward eﬀects: Firms with negative proﬁts will be closed
down by its owners as investors solely care about ﬁnancial returns. As long as a
ﬁrm can exist, it will provide the quality level q∗
F described in lemma 1. Nonproﬁts
are the organizational form whose owners, by deﬁnition, care least about proﬁts.
If a nonproﬁt’s existence is threatened, the social planner may increase the fee fN.
This would aﬀect the set of owners by driving the marginal owner ˜ θN upwards,
but it would neither aﬀect the equilibrium quality level of q∗
N = 1 nor the goal
alignment among its members.31
The case of cooperatives is less obvious. When proﬁts become negative, the
social planner may levy a fee fC that, in contrast to the case with πC(q∗
C) ≥ 0,
would aﬀect the set of owners as nobody could expect to get back his entire
upfront payment later in the form of dividends. The marginal owner ˜ θC would
move upwards, as would the median owner. Initially, the equilibrium quality level
q∗
C would hence increase, and so would the price p∗
C and the marginal buyer ˆ θC.
31Note that in our previous analysis fN was levied because of eﬃciency reasons – to avoid
costs of D – while here it is used as a means to enable existence when proﬁts turn negative.
22Thus, apart from a fee income eﬀect, levying fC would entail a membership eﬀect
and a revenue eﬀect, the aggregate eﬀect of which on a cooperative’s income does
not have a clear-cut sign.32 Despite increased quality, the relative position of q∗
C,
however, would not change as the upper bound on q∗
C is still qSB (proposition
1 remains valid). Note, nevertheless, that a tighter budget can, under certain
circumstances, increase the eﬃciency of a cooperative.
Generally, if losses in any organizational form are suﬃciently high it will not be
able to exist. As a consequence, choosing this organizational is not in the social
planner’s strategy space any more. The de facto eﬃcient form can thus diﬀer
from the theoretically eﬃcient form characterized in proposition 2. Alternatively,
if an organizational form is found to be eﬃcient for speciﬁc parameter realizations
but incurs negative proﬁts, the social planner (as a government) may decide to
ﬁnance it via lump-sum transfers. This can be interpreted as creating a kind of
public organization, a topic that is of high importance in itself (not least because
of the interaction between the public ﬁnancier and the formal, private owners)
but not the focus of our analysis.33
In the next subsection we will discuss another implication of negative proﬁts
for the social planner’s objective to maximize eﬃciency: strategic underfunding.
Strategic underfunding and membership fees: Up to now, we constrained
the analysis to cases where organizational proﬁts are non-negative. If this as-
sumption is relaxed, the social planner might be able to raise organizational eﬃ-
ciency: For certain parameter combinations, setting up an underfunded nonproﬁt
increases total surplus. As the quality level chosen by its members is ineﬃciently
high, choosing insuﬃciently low levels of fees to ﬁnance operations renders the
high quality unfeasible. As a consequence, members would (unanimously) choose
the highest quality achievable under the restricted budget. Hence, ineﬃciently
high quality levels may be reduced towards the eﬃcient quality level without
jeopardizing goal alignment among members. Restricting the ﬁnancial situation
32Note that the relation between the marginal owner and quality is actually non-monotonic.
Once the marginal owner surpasses θ = 1/2, quality and price actually decrease in ˜ θC. Hence,
from an eﬃciency perspective, the membership eﬀect (increasing ˜ θC) can both reduce ineﬃcient
inclusion (if ˜ θC < 1/2) or create ineﬃcient exclusion (if ˜ θC ≥ 1/2).
33Refer to Besley and Ghatak (2001) or DeWenter and Malatesta (2001) for related literature.
23of nonproﬁts can therefore be a welfare increasing strategy.34 On the other hand,
the social planner needs to make sure that the fee asked for is not too low: If low
fees make nonproﬁt membership so attractive that the marginal owner ˜ θN < 1/2,
eﬃciency is increased via lower quality produced but is decreased because costs
of collective decision making will accrue.
Allowing strategic underfunding of nonproﬁts by tightening their budget con-
straint would thus add new aspects to the choice and structure of organizations.
However, tightening the constraint also calls for changes to the owners’ strategy
space: Individual owners with high preferences for quality may (individually or
collusively) choose to support an organization’s budget with private donations.
This would relax the ﬁnancial constraints imposed by the social planner again
and thwart the beneﬁts of underfunding. As introducing strategic funding and
donations is beyond the focus of our paper, we leave this issue for future research.
Exclusion, inclusion, and private beneﬁts of control: If expected proﬁts
of an organization are positive, each consumer (weakly) has incentives to become
its owner. As indicated above, ownership of consumers with low preferences for
quality (with θ < 1/2) can have two direct eﬀects on their fellow owners, both
of them potentially reducing eﬃciency: It can cause costs of collective decision
making and, via majority voting, it can decrease the median owner’s position and
hence the quality chosen. These considerations support the view that, from the
perspective of consumption-oriented consumers (whose θ > 1/2), it could be nec-
essary to have some tool to exclude certain groups of consumers in order to shelter
other owners’ interests (and to ensure overall eﬃciency of the organization).
In ﬁrms, due to their one-dimensional objective function, such a shelter is
not necessary. In nonproﬁts, the non-distribution constraint enables the social
planner to easily implement a fee that avoids ineﬃcient inclusion of owners (with
respect to D).35 In cooperatives though, tying dividend payments to owners’
34Propper, Burgess, and Green (2004) ﬁnd in a study of the UK hospital industry that the
relation between competition and quality of care in hospitals is negative. Within our model,
increased competition (and thus lower revenues) lowers nonproﬁt quality if the organizational
budget constraint binds. In this case, hospitals would have to decrease quality as the originally
preferred, maximum quality is not feasible anymore. However, ‘buyers’ of hospital services in
the UK market are public agents who care mostly about prices and less about quality.
35Refer to lemma 2 for more details.
24actions (such as the purchase decision in our model) is the only tool to restrict
ineﬃcient inclusion, as long as operating proﬁts are positive. When proﬁts are
negative, the set of (ineﬃcient) owners can be additionally reduced, driving ˜ θC
and ˆ θC apart. The same mechanism (called membership eﬀect above), however,
can also create ineﬃcient exclusion of consumers whose θ is slightly above 1/2:36
if M is very large and high fees have to be collected to sustain operations of the
cooperative, it is likely that the marginal owner’s position is above 1/2. Then,
existence of the cooperative is paid for by reduced eﬃciency.
Taking the issue of exclusion of speciﬁc types of owners even further adds
another interpretation to our model: The consumer surplus we modelled could
be interpreted in the broader sense of private beneﬁts of control. Even in orga-
nizations that are ﬁrms in a legal sense it could be proﬁtable not to accept all
types of investors as owners, given incumbent owners’ private beneﬁts of control
are large enough.This could be the case for structures like joint ventures, closely
held ﬁrms or family-controlled and owner-managed ﬁrms.37
Monopolistic pricing: In our previous analysis, price and quality choice of
all organizations were delegated to a self-interested manager. However, owners
were able to exert control by contracting on product quality. Given contractible
quality, one might wonder whether prices could also be determined by an organi-
zation’s owners. In our set-up, we have assumed a very simple cost structure (zero
cost of production). Usually, however, cost components in an organization are
numerous, ﬂuctuating, and consequently hard to evaluate for an outsider. This
is one reason why tasks are delegated to a professional manager. In a nonproﬁt
or cooperative, members then might only observe and evaluate the organization’s
budget after production and sales. With some discretion on costs, a manager
could then always justify monopolistic price levels via budget break-even.38
36Appendix A.4 shows that the quality level of the cooperative is most eﬃcient at ˜ θC = 1
2.
37It is well-known that there are many ﬁrms, in particular small and medium sized ones,
where the owners’ interests are not restricted to pure maximization of proﬁts. Potentially, our
model of cooperatives is more applicable to explain their behavior than our model of the ﬁrm.
38It is straightforward to see that the managerial pricing behavior is optimal for ﬁrm owners.
However, analyzing the simultaneous decision of nonproﬁt or cooperative owners on price and
quality is tedious as one would have to take ownership decisions into account and to distinguish
between eﬀects on insiders versus outsiders. We leave these issues to future research.
25Managerial altruism: In the analysis, the manager only incurred costs from
producing higher quality. However, one can argue that often employees and man-
agement derive some beneﬁts from higher quality production as well (see Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2001, for example). Assume that a manager derives a personal
beneﬁt b(q) ≥ 0 from producing quality q, where 0 ≤ b0(q) ≤ e0(q). Given a
zero outside option wage and a quality level q, the wage of a manager can thus
be reduced by the size of the personal beneﬁt. Hence, cooperatives and ﬁrms
would provide higher qualities, and nonproﬁts would be able to provide maxi-
mum quality at lower costs. Qualitatively, however, altruism does not change our
results.39
7 Conclusion
This paper highlights some key diﬀerences between ﬁrms, nonproﬁts and cooper-
atives where each of these organizations is governed by economic principles and
rational decision making. The diﬀerent organizational structures and members’
objective functions lead to diﬀerent costs of ownership and thus aﬀect organiza-
tional eﬃciency. The ﬁnal eﬃciency trade-oﬀ then depends on the competitive
environment, the decision making process and technology.
In the static eﬃciency comparison, cooperatives are the optimal organizational
form when costs of collective decision making are suﬃciently low. Members of
a cooperative are concerned with both operational proﬁts as well as (their own)
consumer surplus. In an environment with imperfectly competitive markets, the
overall objective function in a cooperative most closely resembles the objective
function of a social planner. The drawback of this more complex objective func-
tion lies in the cost of collective decision making for the heterogenous set of
owners. As a consequence, cooperatives will be preferable whenever there is a
suﬃciently low number of members which can coordinate easily or whenever the
membership base is suﬃciently homogeneous.
39This result relates to the literature on objectives of owners and managers in nonproﬁts.
Note that our focus is on the level playing ﬁeld among organizational forms, so we explicitly
exclude potential self-selection eﬀects of managers of diﬀerent types to diﬀerent organizational
forms (see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Francois (2003) provides another approach by
recruiting managers from the set of consumers.
26Firms are optimal if costs of collective decision making drive out cooperatives
and if the costs of incentivising a manager to increase quality are high. In other
words, ﬁrms are a low-cost means to produce quality as they oﬀer the beneﬁts
of a straightforward organizational form where goal alignment is easily ensured.
This should be an advantage, in particular, if there is high uncertainty about
aspects such as the costs of producing high quality or about the heterogeneity or
stability of members’ preferences. This might provide an intuitive reason why we
observe so many organizations being set up as proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms.
Finally, nonproﬁts serve as a means to commit to the production of high
quality due to the lack of alternative usage of an organization’s proﬁts. If a
group of consumers has high but heterogeneous valuations of quality that cannot
be fully revealed (or are too costly to uncover), then founding a nonproﬁt may be
an optimal organizational solution. As the quality level produced under nonproﬁt
organization is ineﬃciently high, it only dominates other organizational forms as
long as the costs of raising quality (by inducing additional managerial eﬀort) is
low.
The results of our static analysis can be transformed into the following hy-
potheses:
• If the owners of an organization have an interest in consuming its output
– cooperatives will prevail, if costs of collective decision making are low
(e.g. due to a homogenous membership-base);
– if costs of collective decision making increase, nonproﬁts should prevail
when additional quality is inexpensively produced, and ﬁrms other-
wise.
• The quality produced by an organization is higher
– the higher the share of buyers in the organization’s owners;
– the lower the share of proﬁts in total payoﬀs of owners.
Another implication from our analysis is that nonproﬁts and cooperatives may
look very similar from an outsider’s point of view: Both may break even given
their budget, and members of both organizational forms may ﬁnance additional
quality by paying membership fees.40 In terms of the budget, the real diﬀerence
40In contrast, ﬁrms that just break even are on the verge of bankruptcy (in a one-shot game).
27between nonproﬁts and cooperatives is that the former face an ex ante non-
distribution constraint, while the latter might simply be ﬁnancially restricted ex
post and therefore do not pay any dividends either.
Apart from the static eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, this paper also considers changes
in organizational forms due to changes in the market environment. Increases in
competition have a disciplining eﬀect on both ﬁrms and cooperatives: In order
to compensate for lower demand, both organizational forms adjust the quality
oﬀered upwards. This implies that both organizations will be preferable to the
nonproﬁt form more often. While the net eﬀect on organizational eﬃciency may
be ambiguous when cooperatives and ﬁrms are compared, our results suggest that
for standard technologies, ﬁrms will react more strongly to competitive pressure.
In sum, an increase in competition will aﬀect organizational choice as follows:
• ﬁrms and cooperatives will dominate nonproﬁt organizations more often;
• ﬁrms will dominate cooperatives more often.
Although these hypotheses still await empirical testing, (anecdotal) evidence from
studies of demutualization and from the statements made in the wake of the
NYSE, Mastercard and Visa announcements suggests that competition plays an
important role in organizational changes. Obviously, our theoretical analysis has
suppressed other important aspects of organizational choice (such as taxes or
ﬁnancing restrictions). Nevertheless, it appears to us that competitive pressures
induced the owners of these organizations to reassess organizational form.
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Table 1: Major organizational diﬀerences
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
(i): The assumptions on the eﬀort cost function in (3) and (11) ensure existence







4(qF − q0)2 − e
0(qF) = 0 (18)
which deﬁnes q∗
F. The requirement q∗
F > q0 + p0 is fulﬁlled whenever
e







F − q0)2 ≥ 0 (19)





F − q0)3 − e
00(q
∗
F) < 0. (20)
(ii) follows from the absence of θi in the ﬁrst-order condition. Q.E.D.
32A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
(i): The ﬁrst-order derivative of consumer/owner i’s objective function is θi − 1
2.
This is strictly positive for θi > 1
2 and strictly negative for θi < 1
2. Hence,
there are potential conﬂicting interests, such that a decision by majority voting
is required. However, even under maximum ownership (marginal member equals
marginal consumer, ˜ θN = ˆ θN > 0), the median owner’s preference parameter θ is
always above 1
2. Hence, maximum quality q∗
N = 1 is always chosen.
(ii): While the quality q∗
N oﬀered is unaﬀected by the position of the marginal
member, ˜ θN < 1
2 implies that costs of collective decision making D have to be
incurred. Restricting the set of owners to θi ∈ [1/2,1] would thus be eﬃciency en-
hancing by establishing goal alignment among owners. Hence, the social planner
levies a fee that is acceptable for all θi ∈ [1/2,1] but deters all θi < 1
2 from owner-
ship.41 This is achieved by a fee fN satisfying ψ(θi = 1
2,p∗,qN = 1)−fN = 0 which
results in fN =
q0−p0
2 . To avoid free-riding among consumers with θi ≥ 1/2, i.e.
refusing to pay the fee but enjoying beneﬁts from qN = 1, the social planner con-
ditions the organizational set-up on all consumers with ψ(θi,p∗,qN = 1)−fN ≥ 0
to join the organization.42 Since ψ(θi,p∗,q∗
N) − fN is increasing in θi consumers
with θi ≥ 1
2 will become members.
(iii) follows directly from (ii). Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3












)(1 − ˜ θC). (21)
Hence, the individually optimal quality levels diﬀer for diﬀerent θi; it is impossible
to ﬁnd two members with distinct preferences θ who would prefer the same level
of quality. Consequently, collective decision making by a majority vote leads to
the outcome preferred by the median member. Substituting the median member’s
41Because of the non-distribution constraint, the sum collected from the members, together
with any proﬁts from operations, will be given to some charitable organization after production
and sales have occurred; there is no deadweight loss from collecting the fee.
42Note that restricting the marginal member to strictly above 1/2 would lead to the same
result as long as the fee levied and the minimum membership condition match.
33preference parameter
1+˜ θC








4(qC − q0)2 +
˜ θC(1 − ˜ θC)
2
. (22)
Now, use the fact that every consumer who is eligible to join the cooperative will
do so as, due to our assumption in (4), he expects a positive dividend. Therefore,





2(qC−q0) (marginal member equals marginal consumer). This results in q∗
C as
deﬁned in the proposition. Finally, second-order conditions require
SOCC ≡
1











to hold, again with ˜ θC = ˆ θ∗
C.
(ii) follows from the individually optimal quality as speciﬁed in (21).
Note that the social planner is unable to aﬀect the outcome by levying a fee.
While excluding some consumers from the set of owners would not aﬀect the
need for costly collective decision making,43 exclusion of some consumers from
the set of owners would aﬀect the position of the median and thus the resulting
quality level: Comparison of the deﬁnitions of q∗
C and qSB shows that q∗
C ≤ qSB
and that q∗
C is maximized (closest to qSB) at ˜ θC = 1
2. However, any fee income
(1−˜ θC)f would ﬁnally enter the operational proﬁts and be distributed among the
owners. With consumers anticipating the repayment in t = 4 of any fee levied in
t = 0, fees do not aﬀect the membership decision of individual consumers. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
The results are based on the convexity assumption in (3): q∗
C > q∗
F follows from
q0+p0 < qj and hence
p0
qj−q0 < 1 for j ∈ {F,C,N}; q∗
N > qSB by assumption (11);
qSB > q∗
C for p0 > 0 and qSB = q∗
C for p0 = 0. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
(i): The diﬀerence between total surplus under nonproﬁt and under ﬁrm organi-

















43The only possibility for the social planner to avoid conﬂicting interests would be to reduce
the set of members to a single individual. This, however, is in contrast to our focus on collective
ownership and our deﬁnition of a cooperative.
34results in the given condition for superiority of the nonproﬁt organization.
(ii): The same is true analogously for TSC −TSF, which provides condition (16)
for cooperatives to provide total surplus at least as high as ﬁrms. To see that












C−q0)2 (see lemma 3). Inserting this into the deﬁnition











C − q0)2 ≥ 0 (24)
Hence, for p0 > 0 and D suﬃciently low, cooperatives are always more eﬃcient
than ﬁrms.
(iii): TSC −TSN ≥ 0 provides condition (17) for cooperatives to generate higher
total surplus than nonproﬁts. Q.E.D.
Remark: Note that ¯ DCN R 0: (a) For q∗
C  q∗













C−q0)2. For p0 = 0 this implies ¯ DCN > 0.




8(1−q0)2 with ε > 0 arbitrarily small
(but condition (11) still satisﬁed), q∗
C  qSB = q∗











8(qSB−q0)2 is possible by convexity of e(q). Consequently, ¯ DCN ≤
p2
0
8 ((qSB − q0)−2 − (q∗
C − q0)−1(q∗
N − q0)−1) ≤ 0 is possible as well since qSB−q∗
C >
q∗
N − qSB > 0.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
(i): q∗
N is independent of any parameter changes as long as its level, q∗
N = 1, can
be ﬁnanced by operational proﬁts. This is satisﬁed by assumption (4).
(ii): Total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) of the ﬁrm (18) and
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To see the sign of
dq∗
C
dp0 , note that: SOCC < 0 due to the second-order condition in








Remark: Total diﬀerentiation of the FOC of the ﬁrm (18) with respect to the








≤ 0 . (27)
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C−q0)2 ≤ 0. The
quality level of the nonproﬁt remains unaﬀected by q0.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) and (ii) follow directly from lemma 4.
(iii): Using SOCF, SOCC, ˜ θC = ˆ θC and
d˜ θC






















F − q0)3 (29)
The sign of this diﬀerence depends on the speciﬁc model parameters (both nu-
merators are positive, with the ﬁrst being larger, both denominators are negative,
























The RHS of (30) is always negative because of Proposition 1. The sign of the
LHS however depends on the shape of the eﬀort cost function.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Generally, the diﬀerence in total surplus between two organizations j,k ∈ {F,N,C},
k 6= j is
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dp0 ≤ 0 and
e0(q∗
F) ≤ 1



















(iii): For the diﬀerence TSC − TSF, inserting e0(q∗
F) and e0(q∗
C) from the ﬁrm’s












































Apart from the ﬁrst term, all expressions in (35) are weakly positive. Hence, for






dp0 ≥ 0 is a suﬃcient condition.
Lemma 5.(iii) provides the conditions for the latter inequality to hold. Q.E.D.









































































dq0 ≤ 0 and e0(q∗
F) ≤ 1
4.










dq0 ≤ 0 and e0(q∗
C) ≤ 3
8.
For the diﬀerence TSC − TSF, the sign of the derivative with respect to q0 is
generally indeterminate.
A.10 Numerical Example
To illustrate the eﬃciency comparisons and the eﬀects of costs of collective deci-





where x ∈ [1.9;2.0] to meet the restrictions imposed by our model. We addition-
ally assumed q0 = 0.1 and p0 = 0.09 (ﬁgure 1) or a decrease in p0 from 0.09 to 0.06
(ﬁgure 2). Quality levels chosen and total surplus are then calculated explicitly
for each organization. Figures 1 and 2 then plot levels of D ∈ [0.010;0.024] along
the ordinate against the convexity measure.
Remark: The results from the numerical calculations do not depend on the spe-
ciﬁc form assumed above: Similar numerical computations were undertaken for
e(q) = xq2 and e(q) = 1
4q1+x as speciﬁc functional forms. For valid parameter
ranges and diﬀerent degrees of convexity x, the same patterns emerge as those
depicted in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
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